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Aristotle thinks that if you want to live well, you should organize your life by 
reference to the best thing that humans can achieve in action—something he calls “the 
human good.” In Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7, Aristotle helpfully defines the human good as 
“activity of the rational part of the soul on the basis of virtue and if there are more virtues 
than one, on the basis of the best and most end-like virtue and moreover in an end-like 
[i.e. complete] life” (1098a16-18). This definition is the conclusion of what is known as 
“the ergon argument” (a.k.a. “the function argument”). In this essay, I aim to clear the 
way for a new interpretation of this argument, and I do so by questioning the ubiquitous 
assumption that the ergon of something is always the proper activity of that thing. I argue 
that though Aristotle has a single concept of an ergon, he identifies the ergon of any X 
(that has an ergon) as an activity in some cases but a product in others, depending on the 
sort of thing the X is—for while the ergon of the eye is seeing, the ergon of a sculptor is 
not sculpting but a sculpture. This alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of an 
ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the ergon argument to be what, I argue, 
it ought to be: “the best achievement of a human.” On my interpretation of the argument, 
Aristotle assumes that the human good is the best achievement of a human, and he uses 
the concept of an ergon in order to gain clarity on what this achievement might be. He 
reasons that just as the best achievement of a sculptor will be a version of his ergon, 
which is a sculpture, so the best achievement of a human will be a version of his ergon, 
which is a certain activity of living. On the basis of this recovered bit of reasoning I close 
by offering, and briefly discussing, a new reconstruction of the ergon argument. 
                                                
  For comments on various versions of this essay, I would like to thank Brookes Brown, Caleb Cohoe, John 
Cooper, Sherif Girgis, Brad Inwood, Barry Maguire, Jimmy Martin, Rachel Parsons, Gideon Rosen, David 
Sedley, Mor Segev, Simon Shogry, three anonymous referees, as well as audiences at Princeton University 
and the Humboldt University, Berlin.   I especially thank Hendrik Lorenz and Benjamin Morison as they 
commented on numerous drafts and helped me to develop my ideas from the very beginning. 
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2. “Ergon” in the Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7: Reasons for a Reassessment 
 
In Nicomachean Ethics [NE] 1. 2, Aristotle introduces the phrase “the human 
good” to label what he has explained as the highest, and thus best, of all things achievable 
in action by humans. To be “best” (NE 1. 2, 1094a22) is to be most of all an end: an end 
that we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and one for the 
sake of which we choose everything else (1. 2, 1094a18-20). Aristotle notes that while 
the many and the wise agree in naming the best good “eudaimonia” (“happiness”), they 
disagree over what exactly this is (1. 4, 1095a17-22). After briefly considering and 
critiquing different accounts of what the best good is (1. 5-6), Aristotle gives his own 
account (1. 7) and he does so by means of an argument that pivots around the concept of 
an ergon. This is “the ergon argument.” 
In the lines just before the argument, Aristotle says that while people agree that 
eudaimonia is “the best <good>,” we still need a clearer idea of what this best good is (1. 
7, 1097b22-24). He then suggests that we might attain this clarity if we grasp the ergon of 
a human. In what I will call “Section A” of the ergon argument, he explains why (cf. γάρ 
at 1097b24) doing so might be helpful: 
 
[Section A] This is because just as for a flautist, a sculptor, and every artisan, and generally, 
for whatever has an ergon and an action, the good, that is, the well [τὸ εὖ] seems 
to be <found> in its ergon, the same would seem to be so for a human, if he has 
an ergon. (NE 1. 7, 1097b25-28)1 
 
ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλµατοποιῷ καὶ 
παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν 
τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ 
ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.2 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own, though they do reflect my consultation of published 
translations, especially T. H. Irwin (trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Translated with Introduction, 
Notes and Glossary [Ethics], 2nd edn. (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1999), C. D. C. Reeve (trans.), Plato: 
Republic [Republic] (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 2004), and the translations found in J. Barnes (ed.), The 
Complete Works of Aristotle [Complete Works], vol. 1-2 (Princeton, 1995). 
2 Unless otherwise noted, I use the Oxford Classical Text edition of Aristotle’s Greek. 
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This passage supplies us with the fundamental principle upon which the ergon argument 
rests: For anything with an ergon and an action, “the good, that is, the well” is found in 
its ergon. I here translate “τὸ εὖ” as “the well,” though (as I will later suggest) “τὸ εὖ” is 
better understood as “the excellent achievement.” But I give this provisional, literal 
translation because our understanding of “τὸ εὖ” turns on our understanding of “ergon” 
since, as is clear from later in the argument, Aristotle uses “τὸ εὖ” to refer to a thing’s 
ergon achieved well (1. 7, 1098a12).  
“Ergon” in Section A has been translated as “function,”3 “characteristic activity,”4 
“activité,” 5  “office” (Fr.), 6  “eigentümliche Tätigkeit,” 7  and so on. Some scholars 
helpfully explain what they take an ergon to be. Barney, for example, says: “the function 
of a thing is the activity proper to or characteristic of it,”8 noting that “shoemaking,” for 
example, “is a function.”9 In some form or other, this interpretation is ubiquitous,10 
stretching back into the Middle Ages.11 Several factors have encouraged it. First, the only 
erga explicitly identified in NE 1. 7 are activities: the human ergon is as an “activity on 
                                                
3 Irwin, Ethics, ad loc.; H. Rackham (trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, Mass., 1934), ad 
loc.; W. D. Ross (trans., rev. J. O. Urmson), Nicomachean Ethics, in Barnes (ed.), Complete Works, vol. 2, 
1729-1867, ad loc.; S. Broadie (comm., trans. C. Rowe), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics [Ethics] (Oxford, 
2002), ad loc.	  
4 R. Crisp (ed. and trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 2000), ad loc. 
5 P. Destrée, “Comment demonstrer le propre de l’homme? Pour une lecture ‘dialectique’ de EN I, 6” in G. 
R. Dherbey and G. Aubry (eds.), L’Excellence de la Vie (Paris, 2002), 31-61 at 61. 
6 R. Bodéüs (trans.), Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (Paris, 2004), ad loc. 
7 O. Gigon (trans.), Aristoteles: Die Nikomachische Ethik (Düsseldorf and Zürich, 2001), ad loc. 
8 R. Barney, “Aristotle’s Argument for a Human Function” [“Human Function”], Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 23 (2008), 293-322 at 293. 
9 R. Barney, “Human Function”, 303.  
10 The view is truly ubiquitous, but here are a few more quotations in which the view is stated or implied. 
C. Korsgaard, “Aristotle on Function and Virtue” [“Function and Virtue”], History of Philosophy 
Quarterly, 3 (1986), 259-279 at 259: “Aristotle reasons that if anything has a function, its good lies in 
performing that function well.” Irwin, Ethics, 183: “The examples of craftsmen <in Section A> suggest that 
the function of some kind F is the goal-directed activity that is essential to F.” Broadie, Ethics, 276: 
“[P]erhaps the examples <in 1097b28-33> are meant… to illustrate the concept of a characteristic function 
(ergon). That the being or essential nature of an individual is expressed through a typifying activity is the 
central doctrine of <Aristotle’s> metaphysics.” G. Lawrence, “Is Aristotle’s Function Argument 
Fallacious?” [“Fallacious?”], Philosophical Inquiry, 31 (2009), 191-224 at 215 summarizes Section A this 
way: “Where the X is something with a function, the X-an good, i.e. the good of an X, consists in its doing 
its function successfully or well.” C. D. C. Reeve, Action Contemplation and Happiness: An Essay on 
Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass., 2012), 238 explains that the ergon of a carpenter is “doing woodwork.” 
11 Aquinas, for example, rephrases the claim of Section A this way: “When a thing has a proper activity 
[propriam operationem], its good and its being well-off consist in its activity [in eius operatione].”  See 
Sententia libri Ethicorum in R. Busa (ed.) S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia [Opera Omnia], vol. 4 
(Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1980), 143-233 at lb1 lc10 n2.  
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the basis of reason or not without reason” (1098a7-8) and the ergon of a kitharist is the 
performance on the kithara (1098a11-12). Second, while I have said that the claim of 
Section A is made with reference to “anything with an ergon and an action” (1097b26), 
some scholars take the Greek to mean “anything with an ergon, that is, an action.” This 
would of course imply that the ergon of a thing is the same as its proper “action.” Third, 
because it is clear that “the well” (τὸ εὖ, 1097b27) of a human being is a doing well and 
that this is “in” the human ergon, which is an activity, scholars assume that “the well” of 
every artisan is a doing well and that it must likewise be “in” their proper activities. We 
will return to these issues. But for now let us just note that on the basis of the broad 
scholarly agreement as well as these last considerations, one might draw the not ill-
grounded conclusion that Aristotle, in the NE ergon argument, understands the ergon of a 
thing to be the proper activity of that thing. 
Yet there is reason to be uneasy. First, even if one assumes that Aristotle uses 
“ergon” to mean “proper activity” in NE 1. 7, one must also note that not long before (NE 
1. 1, 1094a5) and not long after (NE 2. 6, 1106b10) the ergon argument Aristotle uses 
“ergon” in expressions that clearly refer to products. Aristotle would then appear to be 
switching back and forth between different meanings of the word “ergon” without any 
indication that he is doing so. Second, when Aristotle identifies the ergon of a productive 
artisan, he identifies it as a product, not a proper activity: for example, the ergon of 
shoemaker is a shoe and the ergon of a housebuilder is a house (NE 5 (=EE 4). 5, 1133a7-
10; cf. EE 2. 1, 1219a14-21). Third and most importantly, if ergon means “proper 
activity” in NE 1. 7, it is unclear how the claim of Section A is supposed to help Aristotle 
determine the human good, which he considers to be the best thing achievable by a 
human. Take the example of the sculptor. Even if “the good, that is, the well” of a 
sculptor consists in sculpting well, that seems irrelevant to the question of what the best 
thing achievable by a sculptor is—since this is presumably not sculpting but a sculpture. 
These incongruities should give us pause, and because of them we should be open to 
reassessing the evidence for what Aristotle’s concept of an ergon really is. 
This essay consists in such a reassessment, and as I mentioned earlier, my 
proposal will be that in NE 1. 7 (as elsewhere) Aristotle understands the ergon of an X to 
be an activity in some cases but a product in others, in accordance with the sort of thing 
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the X is—for though Aristotle has a single concept of an ergon, he nevertheless identifies 
the ergon of the eye as seeing and the ergon of a sculptor as a sculpture. For ease of 
reference, I will call this the “alternative concept of an ergon.” On my interpretation, the 
way Aristotle understands “the ergon of an X” is similar to the way he understands “the 
limit (πέρας) of an X.” For though Aristotle has a single concept of a limit, he 
nevertheless identifies the limit of a plane as a line and the limit of a line as a point (cf. 
Topics 4. 4, 141b19-22)—and Aristotle thinks a line (having one dimension) and a point 
(have zero dimensions) are radically different kinds of things. When Aristotle speaks of 
“the ergon of a human,” that expression does refer to a proper activity, but “ergon” does 
not thereby mean what “proper activity” means. “Ergon” and “proper activity” express 
different concepts. Similarly, when Aristotle speaks of “the limit [πέρας] of a plane,” that 
expression does refer to a line, but “limit” does not thereby mean what “line” (or 
“γραµµή”) means. “Limit” and “line” express different concepts.  
To argue for this interpretation, I examine passages from Plato’s Republic, 
Aristotle’s Protrepticus, Eudemian Ethics, De Caelo, and Nicomachean Ethics. Along the 
way we see that while Plato and Aristotle share the same basic concept of an ergon, they 
nevertheless differ in their accounts of what an ergon is. On Aristotle’s account (though 
not on Plato’s) the ergon of an X is the end for the sake of which an X, qua X, has being.  
 
3. Plato’s Understanding of an Ergon in the Republic 
 
Plato gives an ergon argument in Republic 1 that scholars rightly take to be a 
precursor to the ergon argument of NE 1. 7. They also assume that Plato and Aristotle 
share the same concept of an ergon,12 and that Plato’s concept of an ergon is that of a 
proper activity.13 Here, for example, is how Reeve translates the account of an ergon that 
we find at the beginning of Plato’s ergon argument:  
                                                
12 Scholars who assume that Plato and Aristotle share their concept of an ergon include, for example, J. M. 
Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle [Human Good] (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1986), 145, 
Irwin, Ethics, 183 and Korsgaard, “Function and Virtue”, 260. 
13 However, I should add that even if scholars are correct in saying that the concept of an ergon in Plato’s 
Rep. ergon argument is the concept of a function, that alone would not give us sufficient reason to conclude 
that the concept of an ergon in Aristotle’s NE ergon argument is that of a function. This is because, as we 
will see, there is good reason to think that neither in the Protrepticus (which certainly comes before the NE) 
nor in the EE (which very likely does as well) is Aristotle’s concept of an ergon the concept of a function. 
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[1st Account:] “And would you take the function [ἔργον] of a horse or of anything else to be 
that which one can do [ποιῇ] only with it or best with it?”14,15 
   Ἆρ’ οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν 
ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ µόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα; (Rep. 1, 352e2-3)16 
 
The translation is representative.17 The same goes for the second formulation (considered 
by Plato to be equivalent to the first, 353a9), which Reeve renders:  
 
[2nd Account:] “…the function [ἔργον] of each thing is what it alone can do [ἀπεργάζηται] or 
what it can do better than anything else.”18 
[Νῦν δὴ οἶµαι ἄµεινον ἂν µάθοις ὃ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, πυνθα- 
νόµενος εἰ] οὐ τοῦτο ἑκάστου εἴη ἔργον ὃ ἂν ἢ µόνον τι ἢ  
κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται. (Rep. 1, 353a10-11) 
 
Commentators seem to be in agreement with the translators. Irwin, for example, writes: 
“Socrates <in Republic 1> appeals to the connexion between the virtue of F and the 
function, or essential activity of F: a good knife is good at cutting, a good eye is good at 
seeing, and so on.”19 
                                                
14 Reeve, Republic, ad loc. 
15 These lines may startle a modern reader, for Plato appears to think that the ergon of a horse somehow 
consists in being used by man. On the basis of these lines Barney assumes that Plato’s general notion of 
ergon is one of “instrumentality” (“Human Function”, 299). I will not fully address this issue here, but we 
should note that Socrates considers this first account to be equivalent to his second account (353a9), in 
which the language of a user or instrument is absent. And so it is not obvious that Plato’s concept of an 
ergon is inextricably tied to that of a “user,” even if Plato (or Socrates) thinks that the ergon of a horse is 
essentially related it to a user. 
16 For citations to the Republic I use S. R. Slings (ed.), Platonis Republicam (Oxford, 2003), which is also 
what is translated in Reeve, Republic. 
17 Cf. R. E. Allen (trans.), Plato: The Republic (New Haven and London, 2008), ad loc; A. Bloom (trans.), 
The Republic of Plato, 2nd edn. (USA, 1991), ad loc.; G. M. A. Grube (trans., rev. C. D. C. Reeve), 
Republic in J. M. Cooper (ed., assoc. ed. D. H. Hutchinson), Plato: Complete Works, (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge, 1997), ad loc.; H. D. P. Lee (trans.), Plato: Republic (New York, 2007), ad loc.; A. D. Lindsay 
(trans.), Plato: The Republic (New York, 1976), ad loc.; P. Shorey (trans.), Plato: Republic, Books I-V 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1937), ad loc.; R. Waterfield (trans.), Plato: Republic (Oxford, 1993), ad loc. Shorey 
and Bloom both translate ergon as “work” throughout the ergon argument, but their translation of the verbs 
that take “ergon” as their direct objects shows that they consider the ergon to be a function: for Shorey, 
“do” at 352e7 and “perform” at 353a11; and for Bloom, “do” both at 352e7 and 353a11. 
18 In the Greek idiom the expression translated as “better than anything else” actually contains the word 
“best” (κάλλιστα), and so the notion of “best” is used in both accounts.	  
19 T. H. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 179, emphasis added. I here mention a few more scholars 
who hold that Plato’s concept of an ergon in the Republic is that of a function. G. Vlastos, “Justice and 
Happiness”, in id., Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 111-139 at 115 writes: “the ἔργον of anything (of a 
tool, like a pruning-knife, or of a bodily organ, like an eye or an ear) is that activity which can be 
7 
Despite this consensus, one should note that throughout the Republic Plato 
identifies the ergon of a productive art (e.g. the shoemaking-art or the housebuilding-art) 
not as its proper activity, but as its proper product. This occurs, for example, in the 
following passage, which comes shortly before Republic 1’s ergon argument. To 
distinguish the art (τέχνη) of wage-earning from other arts Socrates explains: 
 
This very benefit, receiving wages, doesn’t result from <the artisan’s> own art. On the contrary, 
if we are to examine the matter precisely, the doctoring-art makes health [ἡ µὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν 
ποιεῖ], and the wage-earning-art a wage; the housebuilding-art makes a house, and the wage-
earning-art, which accompanies it, a wage, and the same [οὕτως] goes for all other arts: each 
achieves its ergon [τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται], and benefits that over which it is placed 
(Rep. 1, 346d1-6). 
 
Socrates here remarks that the doctoring-art makes (ποιεῖ) health, the housebuilding-art a 
house, and the wage-earning-art a wage, and then places these examples in parallel 
structure with the following claim: “each <art> achieves [ἐργάζεται] its ergon.” This 
indicates that we ought to read “ποιεῖ” as parallel to “ἐργάζεται;” and “health,” “a house” 
and “a wage” as parallel to “ergon.” Consequently, Plato identifies the ergon of each of 
these particular arts not as their proper activities, but as their products. One should also 
note that Plato here speaks of each art achieving its ergon, and there is reason to think 
that not every art issues in a product. This is because later, in Republic X, Plato implies 
both that there is an art of flute-playing, and that the flute-player (in contrast to the flute-
maker) does not make a product (601d1-e2). And so if the flute-player is to have an 
ergon, it will not be a product but an activity, his performance on the flute. If this is so, 
then when Plato speaks of each art achieving its ergon, he would seem to be assuming 
that while the ergon of the housebuilder is a product (a house), the ergon of the flute-
                                                                                                                                            
‘performed either exclusively by that thing or else more excellently [κάλλιστα] by it than by anything else’ 
(353a).” Cooper, Human Good, 145 notes a claim common to both the NE and the Republic 1 ergon 
arguments: “a thing’s excellence is the essential condition of its performing well its ergon.” J. Annas, An 
Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981), 54 writes: “Ergon is what a thing does qua a thing of that 
kind.” R. Barney, “Socrates’ Refutation of Thrasymachus”, in G. Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to 
Plato’s Republic (Malden, 2006), 44-62 at 55, commenting on what she calls “the ‘function’ argument” 
writes, “the function of anything is ‘that which one can do only with it or best with it’ (352e3-4, 353a9-
11).” 
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player is an activity (his performance). Other passages from the Republic suggest a 
similar picture.20  
But is this the same notion of an ergon that occurs in Republic I’s ergon 
argument? As far as examples of erga within Rep. I’s ergon argument are concerned, 
nothing prevents it from being so. This is because even though the erga explicitly 
identified there are activities (e.g. seeing, hearing, living) these are the sorts of activities 
that do not issue in products. And so it is possible that Plato thinks that while the ergon of 
the eye is seeing and the ergon of the ear is hearing, the ergon of a housebuilder is still a 
house. As for textual indications that the same notion of an ergon is present in both 
places, here are three. First, it is only a few pages after the passage above that Plato gives 
his ergon argument, and in the meantime he gives no indication that his use of the word 
“ergon” has changed. He also explicitly notes that his two accounts of what an ergon is 
are intended to apply to anything with an ergon (352e3 and 353a10). Second, Plato 
correlates the transitive verbs ποιέω and ἐργάζοµαι with the erga as their direct objects 
both in the passage above and in the two accounts of what an ergon is: ποιέω in the first 
account (352e4) and ἀπεργάζοµαι in the second (353a11). And third, in the passage 
above Plato speaks of “the ergon of the art” (346d5) and in the ergon argument speaks of 
“the ergon of [an X]” (352d9-e3, 353a10-11) and in doing so he uses the “ergon”-plus-
genitive construction that regularly signifies the ergon proper to an X.21 
But what about Plato’s two accounts of what an ergon is? Current translations 
suggest that an ergon of an X is always an activity: e.g. the ergon of each thing is “what 
it alone can do [ἀπεργάζηται] or what it can do better than anything else” (353a10-11; 
Reeve, trans.). But, as we have seen, ἀπεργάζοµαι and ποιέω do not always indicate a 
                                                
20 Consider, for example, Rep. 4, 421d9-e5, which pretty clearly implies that the erga of potters are pots. In 
that passage, not only is the verb ἐργάζεται again paired with “erga” as its direct object at 421d12, just as it 
was in the ergon argument (I, 353c6-7; cf. 353a10-11), but Socrates also speaks of “the erga of the arts” 
using the “ergon”-plus-genitive construction that, as we noted above, regularly signifies the ergon proper to 
a thing. Consider also the famous discussion of art in Rep. X, where Socrates clearly identifies the ergon of 
a couch-maker as a couch (not couchmaking), and again pairs the same verbs (ποιέω and ἐργάζοµαι) with 
the erga as their direct objects (for example, at 597a1-7 and 603a9-b3). Second, in the course of his 
argument in Rep. 10 he says that the ergon of the rational part of the soul is to deliberate (602d6-e2), 
echoing a similar claim made in the Rep. 1 ergon argument (cf. 353d3-7), and this strongly suggests that in 
Book 10 Plato assumes that while the ergon of a couchmaker is a product (a couch), the ergon of the 
rational part of the soul is an activity (to deliberate). 
21 “ἔργον” in H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th
 
edn. with a revised 
supplement (Oxford, 1968), 682-83 at §VI.1.a. 
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“doing.” Instead, just as the expression “ergon of X” (without changing its meaning) 
indicated an activity or a product in accordance with the sort of thing the X is, so each of 
the verbs in question (without changing their meaning) indicated a doing or a making as 
the case may be. Consequently, we lose the core meaning of these verbs when we 
translate them as “do” or “make.” If we want to retain the core meaning, a few verbs in 
English may help: “accomplish,” “achieve,” “execute,” etc. We can intelligibly speak of a 
statue as something that a sculptor has accomplished or achieved, and we can likewise 
speak of a flute-player’s performance as something that the flute-player has accomplished 
or achieved.22 Now in certain passages it may not be that important to retain the core 
meaning of the verbs in question, but in other passages it is important—and Plato’s ergon 
argument is one of these passages. I recommend that we translate the two accounts this 
way: 
 
[1st Account:] “And would you take the ergon of a horse or anything else to be that which one 
can achieve [ποιῇ] only with it or best with it? (352e3-e4) 
[2nd Account:] “…the ergon of each thing is what it alone can achieve [ἀπεργάζηται] or what it 
can achieve better than anything else” (353a10-11) 
 
A bit later I will make some remarks about how best to translate “ergon.” But for the 
moment, we need only to observe that Plato’s two accounts should be translated along 
these lines if they are to reflect what I am suggesting are the contours of the concept of an 
ergon. Plato, I believe, is trying to give a single account of “the ergon of an X” that can 
nevertheless pick out different kinds of things (activities or products) just as one might 
give a single account of “the limit of an X” that can nevertheless pick out different kinds 
of things (lines, points, etc.).  
If we do understand Plato’s accounts in this new way, we are put in a position to 
appreciate a difficulty—one that Aristotle appears to respond to in the Eudemian Ethics. 
Notice that when Plato in each of his two accounts speaks about achieving something 
“best” (“κάλλιστα” or “ἄριστα”) he understands “best” by reference to a comparison 
                                                
22 Though this use of “achieve” may seem awkward, note that some languages have verbs that have 
semantic ranges that are quite similar to those (that I have just drawn attention to) of ποιέω or ἀπεργάζοµαι. 
Consider, for example, French “faire.” One can say, “J’ai fait un gâteau” (“I made a cake”) or “J’ai fait une 
promenade” (“I took a walk”). 
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class of things that can execute similar erga (353a1-8). However, as we have seen, he 
also thinks that, in the cases where the activity of something issues a product, the product 
is the ergon of that thing and not the activity: e.g. the ergon of the doctoring-art is health, 
not healing, and the ergon of the housebuilding-art is a house, not housebuilding (Rep. I, 
346d1-8). The conjunction of these views creates the following gap when it comes to 
accounting for the ergon of any productive art. Taking the doctoring-art as an example, 
we are not given sufficient conditions for picking out health (as opposed to healing) as 
the ergon. For while the doctoring-art achieves health best (in comparison with the 
shoemaking-art or any other art), the doctoring-art also achieves healing best.23  
 
4. Aristotle’s Understanding of an Ergon in the Protrepticus 
 
Before we see how Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics responds to Plato’s account, 
we should look at a telling bit of text that forms part of what is probably Aristotle’s 
earliest extant ergon argument. In fragment B65 of Aristotle’s Protrepticus, as recovered 
from Iamblichus,24 we read: 
 
If a human is a simple animal and his being is ordered to reason and thought, he has no other 
ergon than the most exact truth, that is, thinking truly about what is [οὐκ ἄλλο ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἔργον 
ἢ µόνη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἀλήθεια καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀληθεύειν]. But if he is naturally composed 
of several capacities, it is clear that when a thing can achieve several <things>, the best of these is 
always the ergon [ἀεὶ τούτων τὸ βέλτιστον <τὸ> ἔργον ἐστίν]: for example, health <is the ergon> 
of a doctor, and safety <is the ergon> of a sea-captain. Now we can name no better ergon of 
thought or the thinking part of the soul than truth. Truth, therefore, is the supreme ergon of the 
thinking part of the soul.25 
 
There are complexities to this passage that I will not now address, but I think we can see 
here the same basic concept of an ergon that we detected in the Republic. Aristotle seems 
                                                
23 Thus, Aristotle does not agree with Plato’s account of what an ergon is—pace, for example, H. H. 
Joachim (ed. D. A. Rees), Aristotle: the Nicomachean Ethics: a Commentary (Oxford, 1951), 48.  
24 Here it is also worth noting that new arguments for the authenticity of the Protrepticus fragments may be 
found in D. S. Hutchinson and M. R. Johnson, “Authenticating Aristotle’s Protrepticus”, Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy, 29 (2005), 193-295. 
25I rely on the text and translation of I. Düring (ed. and trans.), Protrepticus: an attempt at reconstruction 
(Göteborg, 1961), but with some alterations to the translation.  
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to claim that, if a thing can achieve only one thing, then that will be its ergon. But if a 
thing is naturally fit to achieve more than one thing, it is the best of these that is its ergon. 
He then identifies the ergon of a doctor to be health and the ergon of a sea-captain to be 
safety;26 yet he also identifies the ergon of the thinking part of the soul as “truth,” earlier 
glossed by him as “thinking truly” (ἀληθεύειν).27 Consequently, he understands the ergon 
of an X to be “the best” that an X, qua X, is fit to achieve, whether it be beyond its 
activity (as in the case of a doctor or sea-captain) or the activity itself (as in the case of 
the thinking-part of the soul). 
 In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle goes into more detail about what he takes an 
ergon to be. Nevertheless, the Protrepticus account already differs from that of Plato. The 
reason is as follows. When Plato in the Republic speaks of the ergon of X as what X can 
alone achieve or what it can achieve best (ἄριστα and κάλλιστα), the notion of “best” is 
with respect to a comparison class of things that can achieve similar erga. But when 
Aristotle in the Protrepticus speaks of the ergon of X as what is “best” (βέλτιστον), the 
notion of “best” is with respect to a comparison class of things that X, qua X, can 
achieve. This thought is developed in the EE. 
 
5. Aristotle’s Understanding of an Ergon in the Eudemian Ethics 
 
Scholars generally agree that the Eudemian Ethics was written before the 
Nicomachean Ethics but after the Protrepticus.28 In the EE ergon argument, we find what 
                                                
26 Presumably, the many things that Aristotle thinks a doctor, for example, can achieve will be health but 
also healing, and all the various activities that form a part of healing (rubbing, purging, etc.). 
27 Since Aristotle first describes a case where something has only one capacity, the καὶ that links “most 
exact truth” and “thinking truly about what is” is epexegetic. This suggests that what is achieved is a certain 
true activity: thinking truly or judging truly. I take this interpretation to dovetail with the remarks we find in 
NE 6. 2, where we read that the ergon of the thinking parts of the soul is truth and that the virtues of these 
parts are what enable it to think most truly (μάλιστα ἀληθεύσει, 1039b13). Though I cannot here argue for 
this view, I think that Aristotle does not conceive of truth, in its primary sense, as something that lies 
outside the activity of thinking (cf. Metaphysics E 4, 1027b25-27). For a different view, see P. Crivelli, 
Aristotle on Truth (Cambridge, 2004) who maintains that true and false things (πράγµατα) “contribute to 
explaining what it is to be true or false for thoughts and sentences” (7). Crivelli does not discuss Protrep. 
B65 or NE 6. 2. For scholars who find Crivelli’s claims about true and false πράγµατα problematic, see M. 
Wheeler, Review of Aristotle on Truth, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 44 (2006), 469-470 and U. 
Coope, Review of Aristotle on Truth, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2005), 
<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24902-aristotle-on-truth/>. 
28 Here I take it for granted that the EE precedes the NE. However, if we assume that the NE precedes the 
EE, that will only strengthen my argument. This is because the distinction made in the EE is also made in 
the Protrepticus (at B65), which every scholar acknowledges to have been written before the NE. Thus, if 
12 
is probably the clearest case of Aristotle affirming that the ergon of an X is an activity in 
some cases and a product in others in accordance with the sort of thing the X is. The 
crucial passage runs: 
 
It is clear that the ergon is better than the state or the disposition; but ergon is said in two ways 
[λέγεται διχῶς]. In some cases, there is an ergon beyond the employment:29 for example, a house 
is the ergon of the housebuilding-art and not the activity of housebuilding, and health is the ergon 
of the doctoring-art and not the activity of healing or doctoring. In other cases, the employment is 
the ergon: for example, seeing is the ergon of vision, and active understanding <of mathematical 
truth> is the ergon of mathematical knowledge. And so it follows that, when a thing’s 
employment is its ergon, the employment is better than the state (EE 2. 1, 1219a11-18). 
 
This passage is rarely discussed. However, Reeve briefly gives what would presumably 
be a preferred interpretation for those who advocate the ergon-as-function reading of NE 
1. 7. Reeve suggests that Aristotle is here noting that the term “ergon” is “act/result 
ambiguous.”30  
This seems to me highly doubtful. For if Aristotle were noting that “ergon” is 
act/result ambiguous, he could have easily done so by saying that there is one sense in 
which a house is the ergon of the housebuilding-art and another sense in which 
housebuilding is. Yet he does not do this. Instead, when he mentions activities that are 
erga, he only mentions activities that do not issue in products: e.g. seeing is the ergon of 
vision. And when he mentions products that are erga, he goes out of his way to say that 
the activities that issue in these products are not erga. He states: “a house is the ergon of 
the housebuilding-art and not the activity of housebuilding, and health is the ergon of the 
doctoring-art and not the activity of healing or doctoring” (1219a14-16, emphasis added). 
Thus, Aristotle seems to be saying that when a thing’s proper activity is for the sake of a 
product, the ergon of that thing is its product, not its proper activity. 
                                                                                                                                            
we assume that the EE is a later work of Aristotle, there will be evidence that Aristotle subscribes to the 
alternative concept of an ergon both before and after the NE. 
29 “Employment” translates χρῆσις. The employment is of the power (vision, the doctoring-art, the 
housebuilding-art, etc.), and I do not think that the word need imply that there must be a user that is distinct 
from the power. 
30 C. D. C. Reeve, Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1992), 123. Cf. M. R. 
Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford, 2005), 87-8: “[T]he function is in fact a product of action, like 
shoes, or the action itself, like shoemaking.” 
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Notice also how the argument begins: “It is clear that the ergon is better than the 
state or disposition” (1219a11-13). It is only after making this claim that Aristotle draws 
the distinction between two types of erga: erga that are beyond activities and erga that 
are activities. With this distinction in hand, he concludes: “So it follows that, when a 
thing’s employment is its ergon, the employment is better than the state” (1219a17-18). 
Aristotle’s reasoning proceeds like this: (1) The ergon is better than the state. (2) The 
ergon is an activity in some cases but a product in others. Therefore, (3) when the ergon 
is an activity, the activity is better than the state. The implication is that, when Aristotle 
made the claim about “the ergon” at the beginning of the passage (“the ergon is better 
than the state,” 1219a12), he intended it to cover both sorts of erga, and thus was taking 
“ergon” to signify a single concept. 
Where is the unity to be found? Helpfully, Aristotle says precisely where. Just 
before the quoted passage, he makes this claim about everything with an ergon: “the end 
of each <thing> is its ergon” (EE 1219a8),31 explaining that “the end is best, as being an 
end” (EE 1219a10).32 Then he indicates what he takes an “end” to be: “the end is the best 
in the sense of the last <thing> for the sake of which every thing else <is or is done>” 
(1219a10-11).33 It is this idea that unifies the two ways in which ergon “is said” 
(1219a13). In the case of the housebuilding-art, the “last <thing> for the sake of which 
everything else <is done>” is a house (not housebuilding). However, in the case of the 
eye, Aristotle thinks, the “last <thing> for the sake of which everything else <is>” is 
seeing—and this is the activity itself.  
Now if Aristotle had distinguished two senses of the word “ergon” we would 
expect him to give two corresponding accounts of what an ergon is, but he does not do 
this. He only gives this one account, and on this account, certain proper activities (e.g. 
housebuilding and shoemaking) are not erga. We should also note, though we will 
discuss this more in the next section, that when Aristotle identifies the ergon of each 
thing as its end (EE 2. 1, 1219a8), he understands “end” in a certain way. The ergon of 
something is the end for the sake of which that sort of thing exists or “has being”—qua 
the sort of thing that it is. Thus, the ergon of the housebuilding-art will be a house 
                                                
31 τέλος ἑκάστου τὸ ἔργον 
32 τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος 
33 τέλος τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὗ ἕνεκα τἆλλα πάντα.  
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because a house is the end for the sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua 
housebuilding-art, exists or has being. 
Now if one desired more confirmation that we have detected the contours of the 
concept of an ergon in the EE, one need only consider the passage that immediately 
follows the stretch of text we have so far considered. There Aristotle writes: 
 
Having made these distinctions, let us say that a thing and its virtue have the same ergon, though 
in different ways. For example, a shoe is the ergon of the shoemaking-art and of the activity of 
shoemaking. So if there is some virtue that is the virtue of shoemaking and of a good shoemaker, 
its ergon is a good shoe [τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον ὑπόδηµα]. The same holds in other cases also. 
Now let us assume that the ergon of the soul is to accomplish living,34 and that this is an 
employment and a waking state, since sleep is an idle and inactive state. So, as the ergon of the 
soul and of its virtue must be one and the same, the ergon of the virtue is good living [ἔργον ἂν 
εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία] (EE 2. 1, 1219a18-27). 
 
Notice that Aristotle in this passage does not indicate which meaning of the word “ergon” 
he is using, and that is because (as I have argued) he has not distinguished different 
meanings of the word. He has instead indicated the different sorts of things that an ergon 
can be. Now notice how the passage is structured. Aristotle first articulates a principle 
(1219a19-20): the ergon of something and that of its virtue are the same (presumably in 
γένος, cf. NE 1. 7, 1098a8), though different (presumably because one is achieved well, 
cf. NE 1. 7, 1098a12). He then clarifies the principle by applying it to the case of the 
shoemaking-art: the ergon of the shoemaking-art is a shoe, while the ergon of its virtue is 
a good shoe (1219a20-23). He says this holds for other cases (1219a23), and then 
immediately applies it in the case of the soul: the ergon of the soul is living, and the 
                                                
34 Since Aristotle identifies the ergon of the excellent soul as “good life” or “good living” (ζωὴ σπουδαία), 
we would expect him to identify the ergon of the soul as “life” or “living.” It may then come as a surprise 
to read in different translations that the ergon of the soul is “to make things live” (M. Woods (trans. and 
comm.), Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II and VII, 2nd edn. [Eudemian Ethics] (Oxford, 2005), ad 
loc.), “to cause life” (H. Rackham (trans.), Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On 
Virtue and Vices [Eudemian Ethics] (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), ad loc.), “to produce living” (J. Solomon 
(trans.), Eudemian Ethics in Barnes (ed.), Complete Works, vol. 2, 1922-1981, ad loc.), etc. The Greek is 
“τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν.” My solution is to understand “ποιέω” in the way that we argued Plato uses it in Republic I: 
the verb, while retaining the same meaning, can indicate a “doing” or a “making” as the case may be. 
Consequently, Aristotle at EE 2. 1, 1219a24 is not saying that the ergon of the soul is to make things live, 
but rather to “achieve” or “accomplish” living, which would be the same as “living” or “life.” 
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ergon of its virtue is good living (1219a23-27). The implication is that when Aristotle 
spoke of “the ergon” at the beginning of the passage (“let us say that a thing and its virtue 
have the same ergon but in different ways,” 1219a19-20), he was assuming that the ergon 
of an X was in some cases an activity (e.g. the soul’s living) but in other cases a product 
(e.g. the shoemaker’s shoe) in accordance with the sort of thing the X is. 
Why have scholars thought that Aristotle is here distinguishing different meanings 
of the word “ergon”? According to some translations, Aristotle actually says that ergon 
“has two meanings” or “has two senses” (λέγεται διχῶς, EE 2. 1, 1219a13).35 However, 
because Aristotle has no word for “reference” as opposed to “meaning” or “sense,” these 
translations are highly problematic. A much safer rendering of “λέγεται διχῶς” is “is said 
in two ways,”36 for the idea need only be “there can be two different things going on 
when we say <some word>.” This allows for the possibility that Aristotle at EE 1219a13-
17 is not making a distinction between two possible meanings but two possible 
referents—for “the ergon of an X” can refer to an activity or a product. As I have argued, 
the line of thought in the passage suggests that Aristotle at EE 2. 1, 1219a13 is using this 
“λέγεται διχῶς” in this latter way, and I should also add that Aristotle seems to use the 
phrase in this latter way just a few pages earlier at EE 1. 7, 1217a36, where he discusses 
the two ways in which πρακτόν (“achievable in action”) “is said.” Once we appreciate 
this, I believe we remove the last impediment that one might reasonably have to thinking 
that Aristotle in EE 2. 1 supposes the ergon of an X to be an activity in some cases but a 
product in others, depending on what the ergon is. 
 Now that we have outlined Aristotle’s account, we are in a position to see how it 
addresses the difficulty present in Plato’s accounts. As we saw, Plato did not obviously 
have the resources to pick out a house as opposed to housebuilding as the ergon of the 
housebuilding-art. This gap was due to Plato saying that the ergon of X was what X can 
achieve best, where the notion of “best” is with respect to a comparison class of things 
that can achieve similar erga (Rep. 1, 353a1-8). This allowed it to be possible that a 
                                                
35 The first translation is that of Rackham, Eudemian Ethics and the second is both that of Solomon, 
Eudemian Ethics and that of B. Inwood (trans.) and R Woolf (trans.), Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics 
(Cambridge, 2012). 
36 This is how the phrase is translated in Woods, Eudemian Ethics, A. Kenny (ed. and trans.), Aristotle: 
Eudemian Ethics (Oxford, 2012), and P. L. P. Simpson (trans.), The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, 
translated with explanatory comments (New Brunswick and London, 2013).	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housebuilder achieved a house best but also achieved housebuilding best. Aristotle closes 
this gap by giving an account of what an ergon is that employs the notion of “best” 
differently. He says that, if a thing has an ergon, “the ergon of each <thing> is its end” 
(EE 2. 1, 1219a8) and he clarifies this by saying “the end is the best in the sense of 
<being> the last <thing> for the sake of which everything else <is or is done>” (EE 2. 1, 
1219a10-11). Here the notion of “best” is with respect to a comparison class of other 
things that an X, qua X, can achieve, and the way that one of these things is best is by 
being the last thing for the sake of which. This provides resources to pick out house as 
opposed to housebuilding as the ergon of the housebuilder because it is a house (and not 
housebuilding) that is the last thing for the sake of which a housebuilder, qua 
housebuilder, has being. There are also features of the text that suggest Aristotle is 
directly responding to Plato’s account. Just after articulating his own account, Aristotle 
clarifies it by giving the very examples from Republic 1 (346d1-8)—the examples of the 
housebuilding-art and the doctoring-art—that Plato’s account could not obviously 
accommodate and Aristotle pointedly remarks that that the ergon of the housebuilding-art 
is a house, “not housebuilding” (EE 2. 1, 1219a15), and that the ergon of the doctoring-
art is health, “not healing or doctoring” (EE 2. 1, 1219a15-16).  
 
6. Aristotle’s Understanding of an Ergon in the De Caelo 
 
In the EE Aristotle seems to affirm that the ergon of something is the end for the 
sake of which that sort of thing exists or has being. This account also seems to be implicit 
in a line from Aristotle’s natural philosophy, De Caelo 2. 3, 286a8-9: “Everything that 
has an ergon exists [or has being] for the sake of its ergon” (Ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὧν ἐστιν 
ἔργον, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου).” If we pair this with the following passage from the Politics: 
“The housebuilders’ art exists [or has being] for the sake of a house” (ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας 
χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόµων τέχνη; Pol. 7. 8 1328a33),37 we get the very claim we detected in 
EE 2. 1: the housebuilding-art exists for the sake of a house, which is its ergon.38  
                                                
37 Here Aristotle uses “χάριν” instead of “οὗ ἕνεκα,” but this is of little importance. The context of the 
passage makes it clear that he considers the two expressions to be equivalent (cf. Pol. 7. 8, 1328a29).	  
38 Here I should note that Aquinas seems to arrive at an interpretation along these lines. This is despite the 
fact that the Latin translation he was using apparently rendered “ergon” in this passage as “operatio,” which 
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There are also reasons even within the De Caelo to think that Aristotle there is 
employing the concept of an ergon that we detected in the EE. Now it is uncontroversial 
that Aristotle sometimes identifies the ergon of an X as an activity. In fact, just after he 
articulates the principle mentioned above, he implicitly identifies the ergon of the 
heavenly bodies as a certain “eternal motion” (κίνησιν ἀΐδιον; 2. 3, 286a10).39 But 
consider these remarks that come later in the De Caelo, where Aristotle criticizes certain 
philosophers for holding to their view even when it conflicts with the revealed 
phenomena: “<Some philosophers speak> as if certain <principles> did not require to be 
judged by their results [ἀποβαινόντων], and most of all from the end. And the end of the 
productive expertise is the ergon [Τέλος δὲ τῆς µὲν ποιητικῆς ἐπιστήµης τὸ ἔργον]” (3. 7, 
306a14-16). Scholars naturally understand “the ergon” here to refer to the product of the 
productive art since this is what “results” (306a15). (Stocks, for example, translates 
“ergon” in this passage as “product” but in De Caelo 2. 3 as “function.”40) But notice that 
Aristotle identifies the ergon of the productive art as that art’s end, and remember that he 
earlier identified the ergon of each thing as the end for the sake of which it exists (De 
Caelo 2. 3, 286a8-9). This gives us reason for taking seriously the possibility that 
Aristotle is using the same concept of an ergon in both the passage from 2. 3, where he 
implicitly identifies the ergon of the heavenly bodies as an eternal motion (286a10), and 
in the passage from 3. 7, where he implies that the ergon of a productive art is its product 
(306a16). Consequently, he seems to be assuming that the ergon of an X may be an 
activity in some cases but a product in others, in accordance with the sort of thing the X 
is. 
I also think that we can detect the alternative concept of an ergon in the very 
argument of De Caelo 2. 3. Aristotle’s task in this chapter is to explain why there are 
different motions among the heavenly bodies, and he does so by employing the 
                                                                                                                                            
Aquinas understands as “proper activity.” Aquinas notes that the line (so understood) cannot be fully 
correct. He then inadvertently gets at (what I take to be) the actual meaning of the Greek by qualifying the 
claim that “each thing is for the sake of its proper activity” by saying, “or at least <for the sake of> what 
issues from that proper activity, in the case of those things in which there is some work [opus] beyond the 
activity, as is said in Ethics I” (In libros De Caelo et Mundo, in Busa (ed.), Opera Omnia, vol. 4, 1-48 at 
lb2 lc4 n5).  
39 It is perhaps worth noting that this eternal motion (κίνησις) is a very special kind of motion (if a motion 
at all) because there is no internal reason for it to stop—a feature that Aristotle elsewhere seems to think 
holds of all motions. 
40 J. L. Stocks (trans.), On the Heavens in Barnes (ed.), Complete Works, vol. 1, 447-511, ad loc. 
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teleological principle “each thing with an ergon exists for the sake of its ergon” (2. 3, 
286a8-9). He first shows that since the activity of what is divine is “eternal life” (ζωὴ 
ἀΐδιος, 286a9), the ergon of a divine (heavenly) body will be an eternal motion, which 
must be motion in a circle (286a10-12). This is the motion of the outer sphere, which 
carries the fixed stars. He then articulates a long chain of conditions necessary for this 
eternal motion, culminating in the claim that there must be an eternal process of 
terrestrial generation (286b1-2). In order that there should be this eternal process of 
generation, Aristotle thinks, there must be different, oblique motions in the heavens 
(286b2-4). These other motions belong to the inner spheres that contain the planets. The 
upshot is this. Because his explanation for the oblique motions of the inner spheres is that 
they exist for the sake of eternal terrestrial generation, it looks like the terrestrial 
generation will be the ergon of these motions. Consequently, it looks like the ergon of the 
outer sphere is its proper activity (namely, the eternal circular motion), while the ergon of 
the inner sphere containing planets is something beyond its proper activity (namely, the 
eternal process of terrestrial generation).41 
 
7. Remarks on the Expressions “End of Something” and “Ergon of Something” 
 
When Aristotle identifies “the end” of the doctoring-art as health (NE 1. 1, 
1094a8; EE 2. 1, 1219a14), he is thinking of a certain end, namely, the end that is “the 
last thing for the sake of which” the doctoring-art, qua doctoring-art, exists or has being. 
When Aristotle identifies—in the EE and elsewhere42—the ergon of an X as “the end of 
an X” he has this sort of end in mind. To clarify further Aristotle’s thought, we will 
consider three questions that one might have at this point.  
                                                
41 Here the language of “product” to describe the ergon beyond the proper activity of something may be 
misleading. For, of course, in the case I have just described, the ergon beyond the proper activity is still an 
activity (the eternal process of terrestrial generation). The point, though, is just that the proper activity of 
the inner spheres is not the end, but rather something beyond it. The reason this process of generation can 
be an end (even though it is a process) is because it is eternal and so is in a way something complete (cf. 
NE X 4, 1174a19-21).	  
42 Besides the passages we have already discussed, consider: “The ergon is the end” (Meta. Θ 8, 1150a21), 
“That for the sake of which <a house exists> is <its> ergon…” (Meta. B 2, 996b7), and “if each body had 
the ability to progress but not to perceive, it would perish and would not reach its end, which is the ergon of 
its nature” (DA 3. 12, 434a32-b1).	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First, while in the Protrepticus Aristotle identifies health as the ergon of the 
doctor (B65), in the EE he identifies it as the ergon of the doctoring-art (2. 1, 1219a). Is 
there much at stake in this difference? I do not think so. Aristotle uses both locutions 
because when he speaks of the ergon of the doctor, he is thinking of the doctor, qua 
doctor, and what holds of a doctor, qua doctor, holds of him in virtue of his doctoring-art. 
Aristotle more or less articulates this point in Physics 2. 3: “It is always necessary to 
investigate the most precise cause of each thing, just as in other cases: for example, a man 
builds a house because he is housebuilder, and a housebuilder builds a house on the basis 
of the housebuilding-art [κατὰ τὴν οἰκοδοµικήν]” (195b21-24). The housebuilding-art is 
that in virtue of which a housebuilder builds a house. And so if we identify the ergon of 
the housebuilding-art as a house, we have thereby also identified the ergon of the 
housebuilder, qua housebuilder. “The ergon of the housebuilding-art” is more exact 
locution, and so is Aristotle’s preferred expression. Yet because such exactness is not 
always needed, he also speaks of “the ergon of the housebuilder.”  
Second, because “the ergon of each thing is its end” (EE 2. 1, 1219a8) and the 
human good is the end of all things achievable in action (cf. NE 1. 2, 1094a18-22), does it 
follow that the human good is somehow the ergon of every achievable thing, including 
every art (the doctoring-art, the housebuilding-art, etc.)? It does not. Something can have 
more than one end, and the end that is the ergon is not the same as the end that is the 
human good. As we have seen, Aristotle’s examples from EE 2. 1 indicate that the ergon 
of something is the end for the sake of which that kind of thing exists. Thus, in the case of 
the end that is the ergon, Aristotle circumscribes the “for the sake of” relation to the thing 
in question—qua that kind of thing. For example, though the bridle-making-art exists for 
the sake of a bridle, and a bridle exists for the sake of the activity of horse riding, it does 
not follow that the ergon of a bridle-maker is the activity of horse riding. (Horse riding 
would be the ergon of the horse rider, who uses the bridle.) Rather, the “last <thing> for 
the sake of which” the bridle-maker does what he does, qua bridle-maker, is a bridle (cf. 
EE 2. 1, 1219b4). Even if the human good is the end of the various arts because it is the 
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end of all achievable things, it is only the end of the various arts, qua things achievable in 
action.43  
Third, what reason does Aristotle have for identifying the end of the 
housebuilding-art as a house and not housebuilding? In several places, Aristotle draws an 
important distinction between complete activities (e.g. seeing and living) and incomplete 
activities (e.g. housebuilding and shoemaking), and he claims that while the former are 
ends, the latter are not ends but “belong to the class of means to ends.”44 There are a 
variety of ways to mark this distinction, but here is one that is derived from Metaphysics 
Θ 6. If one says, “I am building a house,” that implies that one has not yet built that 
house. But if one says, “I am living,” that does not imply that one has not yet done 
anything. Incompleteness is built into the activity housebuilding, while it is not built into 
the activity of living. Consequently, while there is no internal reason why an activity of 
living should stop, there is an internal reason why an activity of housebuilding should 
stop, and this is the end it is aimed at—a house.45 The fact that Aristotle gives principled 
reasons for marking a distinction between these different kinds of proper activities shows 
that he also has principled reasons for thinking that housebuilding cannot be the end for 
the sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua housebuilding-art, exists. This in turn gives 
him reason for identifying the ergon of the housebuilding-art as a house and not 
housebuilding. For when X’s proper activity is incomplete, X’s ergon will be something 
                                                
43 To see this more clearly, it may be helpful to ask and answer a few questions. What is the end for the 
sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua thing achievable in action, exists? The human good. And what is 
the end for the sake of which the doctoring-art, qua thing achievable in action, exists? Also, the human 
good. But what is the end for the sake of which the housebuilding-art, qua housebuilding-art, exists? The 
ergon of the housebuilding-art: a house. And what is the end for the sake of which the doctoring-art, qua 
doctoring-art, exists? The ergon of the doctoring-art: health. The addition of such ‘qua’-locutions is helpful 
because, though Aristotle clearly subscribes to these distinctions, he is often content just to speak of “the 
end of an X” and let the context do the work of directing the reader’s attention to the one or the other of 
these two ends. 
44 τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος (Meta. Θ 6, 1048b18). For discussions of this distinction see M. Burnyeat, “Kinēsis vs. 
Energeia: A Much-Read Passage in (but not of) Aristotle’s Metaphysics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, 34 (2008), 219-292; S. Makin (trans. and comm.), Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ (Oxford, 
2006), 141-154; and J. Beere, Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta 
(Oxford, 2009), 221-230.  
45 This explains why, even though it possible to say that someone was building a house but did not build a 
house, it is not possible to say that someone was living but did not live. Likewise, while it is possible to say 
that someone was learning French, but did not learn French, it is not possible to say that someone was 
seeing but did not see. Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, Mass., 2000), §23. 
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further, typically a product, and when X’s proper activity is complete, X’s ergon will be 
its proper activity.  
 
8. Aristotle’s Understanding of an Ergon in the NE 
 
We have so far seen that both Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in the 
Protrepticus, Eudemian Ethics and De Caelo appear to think that the ergon of an X is not 
always an activity, but instead an activity in some cases but a product in others, in 
accordance with the sort of thing the X is. Consequently, if in the NE ergon argument 
Aristotle were to assume that the ergon of an X is always a proper activity, he would be 
breaking with a precedent and this would call for explanation. However, as we will now 
see, there are good reasons for thinking that Aristotle in the NE still subscribes to his 
earlier understanding of an ergon.  
Before we focus on the ergon argument itself, we should note a few 
considerations that suggest the alterative concept of an ergon is in use in the NE. First, 
whenever Aristotle in the NE clearly identifies the ergon of a productive art (the 
shoemaking-art, the housebuilding-art, etc.), he identifies it not as the art’s proper activity 
(shoemaking, housebuilding, etc.), but as its product (a shoe, a house, etc.).46 Second, in 
the De Caelo (2. 3, 286a8-9 and 3. 7, 306a14-16), the EE (2. 1, 1219a8) and elsewhere, 
Aristotle maintained that the ergon of X was “the end of an X,” or more specifically, the 
end for the sake of which an X, qua X, has being. If Aristotle in the NE still subscribes to 
this account of what an ergon is (and I see no reason to think he does not), then NE 1. 1 
gives us good reason to think that Aristotle is employing the alternative concept of an 
ergon. For one thing, Aristotle clearly identifies the ends of certain arts as products: 
                                                
46 One example comes from Aristotle’s discussion of benefactors and beneficiaries. Having just claimed 
that benefactors love their beneficiaries even if those beneficiaries are of no use to them, Aristotle says: 
“The same is true of artisans because each is fond of his own proper ergon [τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον] more that it 
would be fond of him if it acquired a soul [ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐµψύχου γενοµένου]. This is most of all true in 
the case of poets for they are extremely fond of their own poems, loving them as if they were their own 
children” (NE 9. 7, 1167b34-1168a2; cf. NE 6. 1, 1120b13-14). This text forms part of a rich chapter, but 
we need only notice two things. First, Aristotle implies that the proper ergon of certain artisans is a product 
beyond their activity: in the case of the poet, his ergon is his poem. Second, the phrase “τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον” 
(“the proper ergon”) used in the first sentence regularly signifies the ergon proper to something’s nature. 
Cf. NE 6 (=EE 5). 1, 1139a16-17: “the virtue <of something> is relative to its proper ergon [τὸ οἰκεῖον 
ἔργον].”  
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“Since there are many actions, arts and sciences, there turns out to be many ends: health 
is the end of the doctoring-art, a boat of the boatbuilding-art, victory of generalship, and 
wealth of household-management” (1094a6-9).47 But Aristotle also, just before these 
lines, explicitly states that the end of an X is an activity in some cases but a product in 
others, depending on what X is. The distinction is given pride of place: it occurs at the 
very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
 
Every craft and every inquiry, and likewise every action and decision are thought to aim at some 
good. And so the good has been aptly dubbed: that for which all things aim. Yet there seems to be 
a difference among ends: some are activities [ἐνέργειαι], and others are certain erga beyond the 
activities [τὰ δὲ παρ’ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά]. Where there are certain ends beyond the actions [τέλη 
τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις], the erga in these cases are by nature better than the activities [ἐν τούτοις 
βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα]” (1. 1, 1094a1-6). 
 
In the first two sentences of this passage, Aristotle identifies the good of something with 
the end of that thing. He then draws a distinction among ends, noting that some are 
activities, while some are certain erga beyond the activities. With this distinction drawn, 
he notes that, in those cases where the erga are beyond the activities, the erga are better 
than the activities.  
I should also note that, though nearly every translation renders “erga” at 1094a5-6 
as “products” (or some equivalent), it is not obvious that the word here means this. 
Instead, I think Aristotle uses the phrase “certain erga beyond the activities” (1094a4-5) 
to refer to products. He does so by the addition of “beyond the activities,” which would 
be somewhat redundant if “ergon” meant “product” and which possibly signals that there 
are other erga that are not beyond the activities (i.e. because they are the activities). 
Aristotle’s use of the indefinite article τινά (“certain” or “some”) also suggests this, and I 
                                                
47 Because he identifies the end of an X with the good of an X, Aristotle also identifies the good of the 
doctoring-art to be health, of the housebuilding-art a house, and of generalship victory (NE 1. 7, 1097a15-
22). Since Aristotle also writes, “Every good is the ergon of an art” (NE 7 (=EE 6). 11, 1152b19), it is 
reasonable to assume that the ergon of an X may be an activity in some cases, but a product in others. I 
should also note that, though this quotation occurs in an objection that is not written in Aristotle’s own 
voice, when he responds to the objection (NE 7 (=EE 6). 12, 1153a24-27) Aristotle seems to assume that 
this particular claim is true.  (I should also add that, though I think that Aristotle employs the same concept 
and account of an ergon in both the EE and the NE, I do not make any crucial use of passages from the 
common books in my arguments.  However, I make some use of such passages, as I do in this footnote.) 
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think we should be discomfited by the fact that the word is often downplayed and 
sometimes left untranslated. Irwin, for example, drops the τινά, translating the line: 
“others are products apart from the activities” (1094a4-5). A reason for this is not hard to 
find. If one translates “erga” as “products,” and yet also translates the τινά, the line seems 
off: “Yet there seems to be a difference among ends: some are activities, and others are 
certain products beyond the activities” (1094a3-5). One naturally wonders: why just 
certain products? Why not all products? When there is a product beyond the activity isn’t 
it always the end?  
Of course, one might think that Aristotle is trying to allow for the possibility of 
by-products (like the scraps a shoemaker makes while producing a shoe). But several 
factors make this unlikely.48 One might also think that τινά does not have much content 
so that it does not even warrant being translated. But this seems unlikely if for no other 
reason than because Aristotle explains how he understands “παρ’ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά” 
(“certain erga beyond the activities,” 1094a4-5) by immediately glossing it as “τέλη τινὰ 
παρὰ τὰς πράξεις” (“certain ends beyond the actions,” 1094a5). Because the phrase τέλη 
τινὰ clearly means “certain ends” it makes sense to take ἔργα τινά as “certain erga” 
Now if we suppose Aristotle to be using the alternative concept of an ergon, the 
τινά makes good sense: since erga can designate activities or products, Aristotle uses the 
word τινά to indicate only those “certain” erga that are beyond activities, namely 
products.49 I should also add that if “erga” here really does mean “products” the last 
sentence is surprisingly wordy. Surely Aristotle would have only needed to say: 
“products are by nature better than the activities that produce them.” Instead, Aristotle 
                                                
48 First, it is not at all obvious that Aristotle would use the word “ergon” to refer to a by-product, and I 
know of no occasion on which he does so. Second, if this were Aristotle’s reasoning, we would expect him 
to add a similar qualification to ἐνέργειαι (“activities”) at 1094a4, but he does not. The reason we should 
expect this is because Aristotle would similarly think that even when the end of a thing is an activity, there 
may still be other activities (besides the end) that the thing does, qua that sort of thing (like the stretching of 
a dancer before dancing, or the playing of scales by a musician). Third, as I note in the main text, Aristotle 
seems to explain what he means by “παρ’ αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά” (“certain erga beyond the activities,” 
1094a4-5) by immediately glossing it as “τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις” (“certain ends beyond the 
actions,” 1094a5). The τινά in the latter phrase is clearly supposed to signal that there are other ends that 
are not beyond the actions, but rather are the actions (as Aristotle has just explained, 1094a3-5). If the two 
phrases are expressing the same basic idea (as they seem to), then the τινά in the former phrase would 
naturally signal that there are other erga that are not beyond the activities, but rather are the activities. 49	  I should perhaps add that even though I take the phrase ἔργα τινά at 1095a5 to refer to products, that is 
not a good reason to translate the phrase as “products.” This is because ἔργα τινά does not mean 
“products,” and we should be trying to translate what these words mean and not what they refer to. 
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seems to convey by means of the phrase “in these cases” (ἐν τούτοις) that there are other 
cases in which the erga are not better than the activities; again, this is because the erga, 
in those cases, are the activities. This is the only use of the word “ergon” before the 
ergon argument, and by using it here, he directs his reader to think of erga as ends (just 
as he does in the EE), and to think of certain (τινά) of these erga as products, namely 
those that are “beyond activities.”  
But even apart from the remarks on translation that I have just made, these first 
lines of the NE (as rendered in almost any contemporary translation) give us reason to 
think that Aristotle in the ergon argument is not speaking of a function by means of the 
word “ergon.”50 Consider Section A once again. After reminding us that people agree in 
calling the best good achievable in action eudaimonia, Aristotle says we still need clarity 
on what this best good is. He suggests that we will attain this if we grasp the ergon of a 
human, and he offers an explanation for this suggestion: 
 
This is because just as in the case of a flautist, a sculptor, and every artisan, and generally, in the 
case of whatever has an ergon and an action, the good, that is,51 the well [τὸ εὖ] seems to be 
<found> in its ergon, the same would seem to be true for a human, if he has an ergon. (NE 1. 7, 
1097b24-28) 
  
Scholars of course assume that Aristotle is here claiming that for anything with an ergon 
and an action, “the good, that is, the well” is found in that thing’s proper activity. But 
there is a serious problem with this assumption. As we just noted, Aristotle offers the 
ergon argument as an attempt to determine the best good achievable in action (1097b22; 
cf. 1. 2, 1094a18-22 and 1. 4, 1095a16-17). And so when Aristotle says that for anything 
with an ergon and an action “the good, that is, the well” is found in its ergon (1097b27), 
                                                
50 That is, even if one thought that “erga” in the first lines of NE 1. 1 meant “products,” the principle 
expressed in these first lines gives us good reason to think it is the alternative concept (as found in Rep. 1, 
EE 2. 1, etc.) that must be present in NE 1. 7.	  
51 I take the καὶ in τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ epexegetically, and recommend that we translate it either as 
“that is” or “in the sense of.” This interpretation is commonly assumed by translators and commentators 
alike. I should also note that at the beginning of NE 1. 2, Aristotle designates a sense of “the good” by 
using καὶ in just this way. He writes: “If there is an end of things achievable in action, which we desire on 
account of itself, and other things on account of this, and we do not choose all things for the sake of 
something else… clearly this would be the good, that is, the best <good> [τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον]” 
(1094a18-22). 
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he must be assuming there is not another sort of thing that such an agent can achieve that 
is better than the ergon. However, the first lines of the NE plainly state that when the end 
is beyond the activity, the ergon is by nature better than the activity. That is, in the case 
of things that yield products, the products are better sorts of things than the activities that 
produce them. Thus, the best sort of thing that a sculptor can achieve is not sculpting, but 
a sculpture. And so if Aristotle is going to locate “the good, that is, the well” anywhere it 
will need to be in the best sort of thing that an X, qua X, can achieve. The thought of 
Section A, then, will need to be something like this: Just as the best achievement of a 
sculptor is found in his ergon (his sculpture), and that of a flute-player in his ergon (his 
performance), so the best achievement of a human will be found in his ergon, if he has 
one. Consequently, Aristotle is assuming that while the ergon of a flautist is an activity 
(his performance), the ergon of a sculptor is not an activity but a product (his sculpture).  
In case anyone might consider this an outlandish suggestion, I now note that the 
alternative concept of an ergon seems to be presupposed in both of the two ancient 
commentaries on the NE that discuss the ergon argument. One of these is the earliest 
extant commentary on the NE (in fact, the earliest extant commentary on any of 
Aristotle’s writings), dating from the second century A.D. The commentator, very 
probably Aspasius, writes the following while commenting on Section A:  
 
If, then, the ergon of the shoemaking-art is a shoe [ὑπόδημα], and we are searching for what the 
end of a human is, we will have to grasp the ergon of a human, qua human. (17. 22-24)52  
 
Later he identifies the human ergon as an activity, and in particular, a rational activity 
(18. 1-2). Thus, Aspasius seems to think that the ergon of an X may be a product in some 
cases (e.g. the shoe of a shoemaker) but an activity in others (e.g. the rational activity of a 
human) in accordance with the sort of thing the X is. The anonymous author of the 
ancient Greek paraphrase of the NE thinks the same. Here is how he rewords Section A: 
 
For just as the good of every artisan is found in his ergon [ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ αὐτοῦ], the good of a flute-
player in his performance [ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν] and the good of a sculptor in the sculpture [ἐν τῷ 
                                                
52 Aspasii in ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria, in G. Heylbut (ed.), Commentaria in 
Aristotelem Graeca, 19.1 (Berlin, 1889), 1-186, ad loc. 
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ἀγάλµατι] (and this generally holds for every ergon and action), so the human good is in the 
human ergon, if there is some ergon of a human, insofar as he is a human. (13. 22-26)53 
 
The idea seems to be that while the ergon of the flute-player is an activity (his 
performance, τὸ αὐλεῖν), the ergon of a sculptor is not an activity but a product (the 
sculpture, τὸ ἄγαλµα). And so both Aspasius and the paraphraser—the only extant 
ancient commentators on the NE ergon argument—assume that Aristotle there employs 
the alternative concept of an ergon. 
My arguments have so far primarily focused on the concept of an ergon used in 
the Section A, but I now note that whatever concept of an ergon is used in Section A 
must be used throughout the ergon argument. Section A makes a claim about whatever 
has an ergon and an action; and the whole point is that, while this claim clearly holds for 
every artisan (1097b26), it will also hold true for a human, if he has an ergon. When 
Aristotle goes on to identify the human ergon is “activity on the basis of reason or not 
without reason” (1098a7), the concept must stay the same. If this is so, and if I am right 
about what an ergon is, then it is an error to suppose that “ergon” in NE 1. 7 means 
“function” or “proper activity.” The ergon argument is not a “function” argument.54 
 
9. The Translation of “Ergon” 
 
How, then, should we translate “ergon”? Any translation must at least be capable 
of applying either to an activity or to a product that issues from an activity. “Proper 
activity” or “characteristic activity” obviously cannot cover the latter case. If “function” 
                                                
53 Heliodori in ethica Nicomachea paraphrasis, in G. Heylbut (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 
19.2 (Berlin, 1889), 1-233, ad loc. 
54 One might consider it a mark against my interpretation that Aristotle just seems to assume that the ergon 
of a human is an activity. For if Aristotle is employing the standard concept of an ergon, on which every 
ergon is an activity, such an assumption would of course make sense.  But if Aristotle is employing the 
alternative concept of an ergon, shouldn’t he seriously entertain the possibility that the ergon of a human is 
a product?  I do not think so.  Aristotle is employing a concept that he shares with Plato, who also assumes 
that while the ergon of the housebuilder is a product (346d3-4), the ergon of a human is an activity 
(353d5), and so we need not think that Aristotle would always need to determine afresh whether the ergon 
of an X is an activity or a product. Also, as we will discuss, the key reason why Aristotle needs to be 
employing the alternative concept is because this is the only way that Section A can be relevant to 
determining the best achievement of a human, and such a reason does not require that Aristotle seriously 
entertain the possibility that the human ergon is a product. 
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is capable of doing so, I believe that is only due to an etymological branch of the word 
that is in important respects unrelated to the branch according to which it means “proper 
activity.” With regard to the latter (“proper activity”) branch, Barney correctly employs 
the word when she writes: “shoemaking is a function.”55 One translation that has the right 
semantic range is “work” or perhaps “proper work.” The Oxford English Dictionary 
divides the meanings of “work” into two: as a kind of doing (I. 1-8) or as something 
made (II. 9-21). We can speak of a “work of art” (say, a statue) but also the “proper 
work” of a dancer (dancing).56 Consequently, if we wish to articulate the pre-theoretical 
concept of an “ergon of an X” that Plato and Aristotle seem to share, it may help to think 
of it as the “work of an X.” 57 
 
10. Two Difficulties for Assuming that NE 1. 7 Employs the Alternative Concept of 
an Ergon 
 
I will now address two reasons why someone might doubt the interpretation of the 
NE ergon argument that I have been sketching.  
First, if Aristotle is using the alternative concept of an ergon, then when he 
identifies the ergon of the kitharist as the performance on the kithara (1. 7, 1098a10-11), 
he is doing so precisely because this is the end of the kitharist, qua kitharist. Aristotle 
must, then, think that the proper activity of the kitharist is a complete activity, issuing in 
no distinct product. Difficulty arises, though, when we observe certain passages in which 
Aristotle appears to assume that the proper activity of every art (τέχνη) is an incomplete 
activity, issuing in a distinct product. Notably, in NE 6 (=EE 5). 4 (cf. NE 2. 4) he says 
that producing (ποίησις) and action (πρᾶξις) are different (1140a2), and he seems to be 
assuming that action (πρᾶξις) is a kind of complete activity and producing (ποίησις) is a 
                                                
55 Barney, “Human Function,” 303. 
56 This is no accident since English “work” and Greek “ergon” are cognate.  See, for example, "work, 
n." OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2014. 
57 I should here note that “ergon” is translated as “work” both in NE 1. 1 and 1. 7 in two recent translations: 
R. C. Bartlett (trans.) and S. Collins (trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, translated, with an interpretive 
essay, notes, and glossary (Chicago, 2011) and J. Sachs (trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, translated 
with glossary and introductory essay (Newburyport, 2002). However, both translations render “τὸ εὖ” at 
NE 1. 7, 1097b27 in a way that implies that the ergon in question is a proper activity. As for translations in 
French, “ouvrage” and “oeuvre” are perhaps the best options, while in German, they are probably “Werk” 
and “Leistung,” and in Italian they are probably “opera” and “operazione” (and to a lesser extent, “lavoro”).  
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kind of incomplete activity.58 Art (τέχνη), he further asserts, is a state of true reason 
concerned with producing (1140a20-21), not action. Thus, he appears to assume that the 
proper activity of every art is an incomplete activity.59  Given that the skill of the kitharist 
seems to be a relatively straightforward counterexample to this claim, there seem to be 
three interpretive options. First, it did not occur to Aristotle that someone might consider 
the skill of the kitharist (or the flute-player, etc.) to be a counterexample. Second, 
Aristotle thinks that the activity of the kitharist is an incomplete activity, issuing in a 
distinct product. Or third, Aristotle in NE 6. 4 is employing the term “art” (“τέχνη”) in a 
restricted sense such that the skill of the kitharist is not an art but an expertise concerned 
with action.  
I will argue in favor of the third option. Against the first option, we should note 
that Plato in Rep. 10 distinguishes between a “using [χρησοµένην] art” (601d1) such as 
the art of flute-playing, and a “producing [ποίησουσαν] art” (601d2) such as the art of 
flute-making. Thus, there is reason to think that Aristotle is aware that someone might 
think that the activity of a kitharist is not an instance of production and so not an 
incomplete activity. Against the second option, consider this passage from Magna 
Moralia 1. 34: 
 
When it comes to things produced and things acted, the power of producing and the power of 
acting are not the same. On the one hand, the expertises of producing have some other end 
beyond the producing [τῶν µὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐστί τι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος]; for instance, 
beyond housebuilding, since that is the expertise of producing a house, there is a house as its end 
beyond the producing, and the same goes for carpentry and the other expertises of producing; but 
in the expertises of acting there is no other end beyond the acting [ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ 
ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐθὲν τέλος παρ’ αὐτὴν τὴν πρᾶξιν]; for instance, beyond the performance of the 
kitharist [κιθαρίζειν] there is no other end, but this is the end, the activity and the action. Practical 
wisdom, then, concerns action and things acted, but art [τέχνη] concerns production and things 
produced… (1197a5-10; cf. 2. 12, 1211b25-32) 
  
                                                
58 Aristotle here relies on his lost “popular discussions” (1140a3) and so we cannot be sure of his reasoning. 
59 Because I have made use of the EE and the NE in my overall argument, NE 6 (=EE 5). 4 is relevant to 
discuss no matter whether I maintain that its proper home is the NE or the EE. 
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Here Aristotle (or some Aristotelian60) clearly asserts that while there is an end beyond 
housebuilding, there is not an end beyond the performance of the kitharist.61 And so there 
is reason to think that, according to Aristotle, the performance of the kitharist is not an 
incomplete activity and so not an instance of production. (Also, if the author of the MM 
thinks that the ergon of an X is the end of an X, qua X, then he would naturally employ 
the alterative concept of an ergon.) In support of the third option, we should note that the 
author of the MM passage uses the word “art” in a restricted sense such that the skill of 
the kitharist is not an art but an expertise concerned with action. This is clear because the 
author states both that the activity of the kitharist is not an instance of production but an 
instance of action, and that “art” is concerned with production and not action. Thus, it 
seems not unlikely that Aristotle is using the word “art” in a similarly restricted sense in 
NE 6. 4.62 
 Second, Aristotle makes the claim of Section A about anything with ἔργον τι καὶ 
πρᾶξις (1097b26), which one could understand either as “an ergon and an action” or “an 
ergon, that is, an action.” Several scholars assume the latter reading, which implies 
Aristotle assumes that the ergon of something is always an activity.63 Both readings of 
the phrase are grammatically possible. However, there are reasons to question the latter 
                                                
60 For a defense of the Aristotelian provenance of the Magna Moralia, see J. M. Cooper, “The Magna 
Moralia and Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy”, in id., Reason and Emotion (Princeton, 1999), 195-211.  
61 The Stoics also acknowledged that some arts (e.g. the arts of dancing and acting) for which the proper 
activity is the end (cf. De Finibus 3. 24). See G. Striker, “Antipater, Or the Art of Living”, in M. Schofield 
and G. Striker (eds.), Norms of Nature (Cambridge, 2007), 185-204. 
62 I believe what I have said above is enough to give us reason to think that in NE 1. 7 Aristotle supposes 
the kitharist, qua kitharist, to have no further end beyond his proper activity. Nevertheless, in NE 1. 7 
Aristotle appears to consider the skill of the flute-player to be an art (τέχνη) (1097b25-27). How do we 
reconcile this with NE 6. 4? I think we must suppose that, while in NE 6. 4 Aristotle uses the word “art” in 
the restricted sense on which only productive expertises count as arts, in NE 1. 7 he uses “art” in a broader 
sense on which non-productive practical expertises can count as arts. Independent confirmation that 
Aristotle in NE 1. 7 uses the word in this broader way comes from combining two observations. First, the 
restricted sense of “art” corresponds to a restricted sense of “action” (πρᾶξις) on which an incomplete 
activity such as housebuilding is not an action but a producing (ποίησις). Second, NE 1. 7 implies that a 
sculptor and indeed every artisan has an action (1097b25-27). Consequently, since Aristotle in NE 1. 7 uses 
“action” not in the restricted but in the broad sense, it makes sense that we would be using “art” in the 
broad sense as well.  
63 For example, M. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics”, in J. E. J. 
Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics (Cambridge, 1995), 86-132 at 112 translates ἔργον 
τι καὶ πρᾶξις (1097b26) as “function or activity” and writes, “What would naturally be meant by the 
‘function or activity’ of a certain sort of craftsman would be that craftsman’s characteristic activity qua that 
sort of craftsman—the activity or activities in virtue of which he is, and is counted as, a craftsman of that 
sort.”  
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reading,64 and if one accepts my arguments about what an ergon is, one should go for the 
former reading instead. If after adopting the former reading one should then wonder why 
Aristotle speaks here (and at 1097b29) of “action,” I suggest the following explanation.65 
Aristotle makes it very clear that he is looking for the best thing achievable by humans in 
action (πρακτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ), where “action” seems to be an activity that partakes in reason 
to some extent. And so it is likely that Aristotle makes the claim of Section A only about 
those things that can achieve things in action—that is, only about those things have both 
an ergon and an action (1097b26), where “action” is not just a thing’s proper activity but 
the sort of proper activity that partakes in reason. The principle of Section A, then, is 
probably not here applied to just anything with an ergon, including artifacts.66  
 
11. Towards an “Achievement” Interpretation of the NE 1. 7 Ergon Argument 
 
Any interpretation of the ergon argument largely turns on how one interprets its 
first section—what I have been calling “Section A”:  
 
[Section A] … Just as for a flautist, a sculptor, and every artisan, and generally, for whatever 
has an ergon and an action, the good, that is, the well [τὸ εὖ] seems to be 
<found> in its ergon, the same would seem to be so for a human, if he has an 
ergon. (NE 1. 7, 1097b25-28) 
 
Though I cannot here fully justify my doing so, I take the claim of Section A to be this:  
 
                                                
64 For example, if we take καὶ epexegetically both at NE 1. 7, 1097b26 and 1097b29, it seems like the 
phrases would propose incompatible extensions for an ergon. The first (ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις rendered as “an 
ergon, i.e. an action”) will have it that every ergon is an action, while the second (ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις 
rendered as “certain erga, i.e. actions”) will have it that only certain erga are actions (with the implication 
being that some erga are not actions). Also, neither Aspasius nor the ancient paraphraser takes the καί at 
1097b26 this way.  
65 Besides the explanation that I offer in the main text, I should also add that the καί may be quasi-
epexegetic such that the phrase should be understood as “including action.” (The same explanation could 
hold for “καὶ πράξεις” at 1097b29.) The rationale for this would be that Aristotle wants to make clear that 
an ergon can be an action, and he might think such clarification helpful because he earlier (at NE 1.1, 
1094a5) used the word “erga” to refer to products. 
66 Pace, for example, G. Lawrence, “Fallacious?”, 206: “the principle <in Section A> is being generalized 
over all functional items, including artifacts.” I do not mean to deny that Aristotle sometimes uses the word 
“πρᾶξις” to mean something like “proper activity,” but I do not think he does so in NE 1. 7. Instead I think 
that the use in NE 1. 7 is more similar to the one we find at NE 6 (=EE 5). 2, 1139a19-20: “it is clear that 
wild animals [θηρία] have perception but no share in action [πράξεως].” 
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[Claim of Section A] For anything with an ergon and an action, the good in the sense of the  
   excellent achievement (τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ εὖ) is found in its ergon. 
 
Like many others, I take τὸ εὖ of an X to be the ergon of an X achieved well (cf. NE 1. 7, 
1098a12; 2. 6, 1106b12). But, of course, unlike many others, I do not think an ergon is 
always an activity. Consequently, I think that the alternative concept of an ergon should 
lead us to understand τὸ εὖ as meaning something like “the excellent accomplishment” or 
“the excellent achievement,” where this can be either an excellent activity or an excellent 
product.67 I also think the excellent achievement is found in the ergon in the way that a 
species is found in a genus (cf. Physics 6. 3, 210a18).68 And so one could also understand 
the claim of Section A to be: For anything that has an ergon and an action, the good in 
the sense of the excellent achievement is its ergon achieved well. Section A, then, locates 
the right class or genus within which to find the human good, that is, the best thing 
achievable by a human. Aristotle reasons that just as a sculptor’s excellent achievement 
will be in his ergon (which is a sculpture, not sculpting), so will his best achievement. 
And just as a human’s excellent achievement will be in his ergon (which is activity of the 
part of the soul having reason), so will his best achievement—that is, the human good. 
This puts us in a position to reconstruct the ergon argument in such a way that it 
is both valid and plausible. Below I list the premises and conclusions of the ergon 
argument roughly in the order in which they are found or implicitly found in the text, 
omitting some sub-arguments (the arguments that a human has an ergon, and the 
argument that the human ergon is an activity of the rational part of the soul) as well as 
some clarifications (e.g. Aristotle’s explication of “rational part of the soul”). After each 
                                                
67 I am here offering an alternative to the common way of interpreting “τὸ εὖ” as “the doing well.” My 
interpretation lines up nicely with the way Aristotle uses “τὸ εὖ” and “τὸ εὖ ἔχον ἔργον” in NE 2. 6, 
1106b8-14, a passage that recalls the ergon argument of NE 1. 7 by developing the connection between 
virtue and ‘the excellent ergon’ that was first introduced there.  
68 This interpretation of “is in” falls between the two interpretations currently available in the secondary 
literature. Some scholars think that when Aristotle says the well “is in” the ergon, he means that the well 
“consists in” or “is” the ergon (cf. R. Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, 1989), 312). Others 
think that he means that the well “depends on” the human ergon (cf. Irwin, Ethics, 183.) Though I cannot 
argue for this here, I take the latter claim to be too weak to allow Aristotle to arrive at his definition, and I 
take the former claim to be one that Aristotle considers false. 
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premise I indicate in parentheses the sections of the text to which the premise 
corresponds.69  
 
P1: The human good is the best achievement of a human (1097b22-23; cf. NE 1. 1-2).  
P2: The best achievement of a human is the excellent achievement of a human with any better-
making features that there may be. [assumption] 
C1: The human good is the excellent achievement of a human with any better-making features 
that there may be. [from P1 and P2] 
 
P3: For anything that has an ergon and an action, the excellent achievement of that thing is its 
ergon excellently achieved (1097b25-28 [=claim of Section A]).  
P4: A human being has an ergon and an action. [From sub-argument in 1097b28-33] 
C2: Therefore, the excellent achievement of a human being is the human ergon excellently 
achieved. [from P3 and P4] 
P5: The ergon of a human being is activity of the part of the human soul having reason 
(1098a7-8). [From sub-argument in 1097b33-1098a4] 
C3: Therefore, the excellent achievement of a human being is activity of the part of the soul 
having reason, achieved excellently. [from C2 and P5]  
P6: For an ergon to be achieved excellently is for it to be achieved on the basis of 
virtue/excellence (1098a15; cf. 1098a8-11).  
C4: Therefore, the excellent achievement of a human being is activity on the basis of the virtue 
of the part of the human soul having reason (1098a16-17). [from C3 and P6] 
 
P7: Activity on the basis of the virtue of the part of the human soul having reason is better if it 
is achieved on the basis of the best and most end-like virtue, if there are more virtues than 
one (cf. 1097a28-30).  
P8: Activity on the basis of virtue of the part of the human soul having reason is better if it 
occurs in an end-like [i.e. complete] life (1098a18-20; cf. 1097a28-30).  
C5: Therefore, “the human good turns out to be activity of the <rational part of the human> 
soul on the basis of virtue, and if there are more virtues than one, on the basis of the best 
and most end-like virtue, and moreover in an end-like [i.e. complete] life” (1098a16-18). 
[from C1, C4, P7, P8] 
  
Several features of my reconstruction distinguish it from all others currently on offer.70 I 
take two of these features to be of central importance, but here I will just discuss one of 
                                                
69 As I understand it, Aristotle does not explicitly state P2 because he takes it (and thus the conclusion C1) 
to be obvious. He does not state P7 because he has articulated his understanding of what it is to be “end-
like” (teleion) earlier in NE 1. 7 at 1097a15-1097b6. He does not state P8 for similar reasons, though he 
does partially articulate the premise just after the conclusion of the argument at 1098a18-20. 
70 Perhaps surprisingly, there are relatively few explicit reconstructions of the ergon argument: P. Glassen, 
“A Fallacy in Aristotle’s Argument about the Good” [“Fallacy”], The Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1957), 
319-322 at 320; D. S. Hutchinson, The Virtues of Aristotle (London and New York, 1986), 55; A. Gomez-
Lobo, “The Ergon Inference”, Phronesis, 34 (1989), 170-184 at 182; D. Achtenberg, “The Role of the 
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them:71 on my reconstruction, the key explanatory middle term of the argument is “the 
best achievement of a human.”72  
Recall that before the ergon argument Aristotle makes it abundantly clear that for 
something to be the human good is for it to be the best thing achievable by humans in 
action (cf. 1. 2, 1094a18-22; I 4, 1095a16-17). Aristotle characterizes the nature of the 
human good in no other way than this.73 Consequently, because the conclusion of the 
ergon argument is a definition of the human good, the key explanatory middle term of the 
argument ought to be “the best achievement of a human.” However, no current 
interpretation supposes this to be the middle term. The reason, I believe, is as follows. 
Since scholars have assumed that Aristotle’s concept of an ergon is the concept of a 
proper activity, they have been unable to interpret Section A in such a way that it is 
relevant to determining the best achievement of a human. They have heard Aristotle as 
saying that for a sculptor, flautist and every artisan, “the good, that is, the well” is found 
                                                                                                                                            
Ergon Argument in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”, in J. P. Anton and A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy IV (Albany, 1991), 59-72 at 62-63; M. Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An 
Introduction (Cambridge, 2005), 80; C. Natali, “Posterior Analytics and the Definition of Happiness in NE 
I” Phronesis, 55 (2010), 304-324 at 317; and P. Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics (Cambridge, 
2009), 66-67. 
71 The other feature of central importance is that on my reconstruction Aristotle distinguishes the excellent 
achievement of a human from the best achievement.  The excellent achievement of a human is “activity of 
the soul on the basis of virtue,” and when Aristotle adds the two criteria “if there are more virtues than one, 
on the basis of the best and most end-like virtue” and “in a end-like [i.e. complete] life” he is listing further 
requirements that something must meet if it is to be the best achievement of a human, which is the human 
good (and not merely the excellent achievement).  Current reconstructions suppose that the proper 
conclusion of the argument is “activity of the soul on the basis of virtue” (what I take to be the excellent 
achievement of a human) and that the two criteria are merely optional elucidations of that conclusion.  See 
the reconstructions listed in the previous footnote as well as the influential (though brief) statement of this 
“implicit criteria view” by J. Ackrill, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”, in A. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics (Berkeley, 1980), 15-34 at 27.  I should add that, though I do not agree with the implicit criteria 
view, my interpretation of Section A can be made compatible with it so long as one identifies the best 
accomplishment of a human with the excellent accomplishment of a human. 
72 What is an “explanatory middle term”? In an Aristotelian syllogism there are three terms, and the middle 
term is the one the drops out in the conclusion. Consider: “Shelters for belongings are roofed. Barns are 
shelters for belongings. Therefore, barns are roofed.” (See J. Barnes (trans. and comm.), Aristotle: Posterior 
Analytics (Oxford, 1993), 231.) The middle term is “shelters for belongings.” Here the middle term is also 
explanatory because it is in virtue of being a “shelter for belongings” that a barn is roofed. Above I speak of 
the key explanatory middle term, and that is because, even though there are several middle terms in the 
argument, “the best achievement of a human” (as used in the argument from P1 and P2 to C1) is the one 
that provides the direct link to “the human good.” 
73 Indeed, even though Aristotle says, “eudaimonia most of all seems to be this sort of thing [i.e. the best 
and most end-like good]” (NE 1. 7, 1097a34), he never says that for something to be the human good is for 
it to be eudaimonia. Though I cannot argue for this here, I think there is good reason to believe that the 
human good and eudaimonia are not coextensive. God, for example, is the primary instance of eudaimonia 
but does not possess the human good since this is the best thing achievable by humans in action. 
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in their respective proper activities. Because the best achievement of a sculptor is clearly 
not found in his activity of sculpting but in his sculpture (or sculptures), scholars have 
had to come up with a different key middle term for the ergon argument. They have 
proposed “the virtue of a human,”74 “the flourishing of an human,”75 “the successful 
functioning of an human,”76 etc. Barney, for example, supposes both that the human good 
is the flourishing of a human, and that the claim of Section A is: for anything with an 
ergon and an action, the flourishing of that thing is its ergon accomplished well.77 
Barney’s interpretation might initially seem attractive. However, when we bear in mind 
that, according to Aristotle, for something to be the human good is for it to be the best 
good achievable by humans in action, we see that Barney’s proposal (as well as any other 
that does not employ the alternative concept of an ergon) is unacceptable. When Aristotle 
arrives at his definition of the human good, he must do so not because this is the 
flourishing of a human or because this is the successful functioning of a human, but 
rather because this is the best achievement of a human.  
To appreciate this point, consider the following requirement for any (charitable) 
interpretation of the ergon argument: it must ensure that if the human good is an activity, 
it is a complete activity. This is because an incomplete activity is essentially for the sake 
of something else, and the human good, in virtue of being the human good, is an end that 
is not such as to be chosen for the sake of something else. Thus, because the ergon 
argument is offered as the explanation for why the human good is defined as it is, the 
argument should ensure that if the human good is an activity, it is a complete activity. 
However, only my interpretation of the argument does this. I think that Aristotle employs 
the alternative concept of an ergon (on which, if the ergon is an activity, it must be a 
complete activity), and that Aristotle supposes that for any X with an ergon and an 
action, the best achievement of an X is a certain excellent version of its ergon.  Contrast 
this with, for example, Barney’s interpretation.  She thinks that Aristotle employs the 
standard concept of an ergon and that Aristotle supposes that for any X with an ergon and 
                                                
74 Cf. Glassen, “Fallacy”. Glassen has in mind human virtue when he speaks of the “goodness of a human.” 
75 Cf. Barney, “Human Function”. 
76 Cf. Lawrence, “Fallacious?”. Lawrence also sometimes speaks of “the success of a human” but assumes 
that this is equivalent to the “functioning successfully of a human.” 
77 Barney, “Human Function”, 312 gives this interpretation of Section A: “If an x qua x has as its function 
to Φ, then the good of an x qua x—its flourishing as an x—consists in Φ-ing well.” She assumes that the 
good of a human, qua human, is “the human good.”
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an action, the flourishing of an X is its functioning well. Thus it could turn out that the 
flourishing of an X is an incomplete activity: e.g. the flourishing of a sculptor is sculpting 
well.  Though the “flourishing of a human” turns out to be a complete activity, that is just 
a coincidence.  On Barney’s interpretation, nothing about Aristotle’s reasoning requires it 
to be a complete activity. Consequently, I contend that we need to assume that Aristotle 
is employing the alternative concept of an ergon if he is to be plausibly interpreted as 
giving the right sort of explanation for defining the human good as he does. 
Why is grasping the correct explanation so important? Aristotle quite generally 
maintains that one understands (ἐπίστασθαι) that something is the case only when one 
grasps the explanation for why it is the case.78 He would, then, appear to maintain that 
one understands his definition of the human good only when one grasps the explanation 
for why the human good is defined as it is.  I have argued that we can grasp this 
explanation—that is, the ergon argument—only if we suppose Aristotle to be employing 




In this paper I have attempted to clear the way for a new interpretation of 
Aristotle’s famous ergon argument of NE 1. 7. In doing so I have argued for several 
theses: (1) the ergon of an X is an activity in some cases but a product in others, in 
accordance with the sort of thing the X is, (2) Plato and Aristotle share this basic concept 
of an ergon, but differ in their accounts of what an ergon is, (3) Aristotle’s account of an 
ergon is “the end for the sake of which an X, qua X, exists,” and (4) the alternative 
concept of an ergon allows the key explanatory middle term of the argument to be what it 
in fact ought to be: “the best achievement of a human.” A full explication and evaluation 
                                                
78 See APo 1. 2, 71b30-31 (cf. Meta. A 1, 981b8-9 and Ph. 1. 1, 184a1-16). In NE 6. 3 Aristotle says that 
one can have epistēmē (“expert knowledge” or “understanding”), strictly speaking, only about things that 
do not admit of change—that is, only in theoretical matters. However, in the same passage Aristotle 
implicitly acknowledges that there are states that resemble knowledge in the strict sense (NE 6. 3, 1139b18-
19), and Aristotle applies the word epistēmē both to practical and productive expertises at various places in 
the NE (e.g. 1. 2, 1094b2-7; 7. 3, 1147b13–17) and in the Metaphysics (e.g. A 1, 981b8-9; E 2, 1026b4-5). 
Thus, it is defensible to suppose that, according to Aristotle, one can have understanding (or something like 
understanding) of ethical truths and that such understanding would require grasping the explanation for 
why that truth held. 
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of this “achievement” reading still await us, but I believe I have here given reasons to 




Achtenberg, D., “The Role of the Ergon Argument in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”, 
in J. P. Anton and A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV 
(Albany, 1991), 59-72. 
Ackrill, J., “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”, in A. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Berkeley, 1980), 15-34. 
Allen, R. E. (trans.), Plato: The Republic (New Haven and London, 2008). 
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981). 
Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention (Cambridge, Mass., 2000). 
Aquinas, T. In libros De Caelo et Mundo, in Busa (ed.), Opera Omnia, vol. 4, 1-48. 
—— Sententia Ethicorum, in Busa (ed.), Opera Omnia, vol. 4, 143-233. 
Barnes, J. (trans. and comm.), Aristotle: Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1993). 
—— (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle [Complete Works], vol. 1-2 (Princeton, 
1995). 
Barney, R., “Aristotle’s Argument for a Human Function” [“Human Function”], Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 23 (2008), 293-322. 
—— “Socrates’ Refutation of Thrasymachus”, in G. Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to 
Plato’s Republic (Malden, 2006), 44-62. 
Bartlett, R. C. (trans.) and S. Collins (trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, translated, 
with an interpretive essay, notes, and glossary (Chicago, 2011). 
Beere, J., Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta (Oxford, 
2009). 
Bloom, A. (trans.), The Republic of Plato, 2nd edn. (USA, 1991). 
Bodéüs, R. (trans.), Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (Paris, 2004). 
Broadie, S. (comm., trans. C. Rowe), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics [Ethics] (Oxford, 
2002). 
Burnyeat, M., “Kinēsis vs. Energeia: A Much-Read Passage in (but not of) Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2008), 219-292. 
Busa, R. (ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia [Opera Omnia], vol. 4 (Stuttgart-Bad 
Canstatt, 1980). 
Coope, U., Review of Aristotle on Truth, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2005), 
<http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24902-aristotle-on-truth/>. 
Cooper, J. M., “The Magna Moralia and Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy”, in id., Reason 
and Emotion (Princeton, 1999), 195-211. 
—— (ed., assoc. ed. D. H. Hutchinson), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge, 1997). 
—— Reason and Human Good in Aristotle [Human Good] (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 
1986). 
Crisp, R. (ed. and trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 2000). 
Crivelli, P., Aristotle on Truth (Cambridge, 2004). 
37 
Destrée, P., “Comment demonstrer le propre de l’homme? Pour une lecture ‘dialectique’ 
de EN I, 6”, in G. R. Dherbey and G. Aubry (eds.) L’Excellence de la Vie (Paris, 
2002), 31-61. 
Düring, I. (ed. and trans.), Protrepticus: an attempt at reconstruction (Göteborg, 1961). 
Glassen, P., “A Fallacy in Aristotle’s Argument about the Good” [“Fallacy”], The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1957), 319-322. 
Gigon, O. (trans.), Die Nikomachische Ethik (Düsseldorf and Zürich, 2001). 
Gomez-Lobo, A., “The Ergon Inference”, Phronesis, 34 (1989), 170-184. 
Gottlieb, P., The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics (Cambridge, 2009). 
Grube, G. M. A. (trans., rev. C. D. C. Reeve), Republic, in Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete 
Works, (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997). 
Heylbut, G. (ed.), Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 19.1-2 (Berlin, 1889). 
Hutchinson D. S. and M. R. Johnson, “Authenticating Aristotle’s Protrepticus,” Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 29 (2005), 193-295. 
—— The Virtues of Aristotle (London and New York, 1986). 
Inwood, B. (trans.) and R. Woolf (trans.), Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics (Cambridge, 2012). 
Irwin, T. H. (trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Translated with Introduction, Notes 
and Glossary [Ethics], 2nd edn. (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1999). 
—— Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995). 
Joachim, H. H. (ed. D. A. Rees), Aristotle: the Nicomachean Ethics: a Commentary, 
(Oxford, 1951). 
Johnson, M. R., Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford, 2005). 
A. Kenny (ed. and trans.), Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics (Oxford, 2012). 
Korsgaard, C., “Aristotle on Function and Virtue” [“Function and Virtue”], History of 
Philosophy Quarterly, 3 (1986), 259-279. 
Kraut, R., Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, 1989). 
Lawrence, G. “Is Aristotle’s Function Argument Fallacious?” [“Fallacious?”], 
Philosophical Inquiry, 31 (2009), 191-224. 
Lee, H. D. P. (trans.), Plato: Republic (New York, 2007). 
Liddell,  H. G.,  R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn. with a 
revised supplement (Oxford, 1968). 
Lindsay, A. D. (trans.), Plato: The Republic (New York, 1976). 
Makin, S. (trans. and comm.), Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Θ (Oxford, 2006). 
Natali, C., “Posterior Analytics and the Definition of Happiness in NE I”, Phronesis, 55 
(2010), 304-324. 
Nussbaum, M., “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics”, in J. E. J. 
Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind, and Ethics (Cambridge, 1995), 86-
132. 
OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2014. 
Pakaluk, M., Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge, 2005). 
Rackham, H. (trans.), Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On 
Virtue and Vices [Eudemian Ethics] (Cambridge, Mass., 1996). 
—— (trans.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, Mass., 1934). 
Reeve, C. D. C., Action Contemplation and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2012). 
—— (trans.), Plato: Republic [Republic] (Indianapolis and Cambridge, 2004). 
38 
—— Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1992). 
Ross, W. D. (trans., rev. J. O. Urmson), Nicomachean Ethics, in Barnes (ed.), Complete 
Works, vol. 2, 1729-1867. 
Sachs, J. (trans.), Nicomachean Ethics, translated with glossary and introductory essay 
(Newburyport, 2002). 
Shorey, P. (trans.), Plato: Republic, Books I-V (Cambridge, Mass., 1937). 
Simpson, P. L. P. (trans.), The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, translated with explanatory 
comments (New Brunswick and London, 2013). 
Slings, S. R. (ed.), Platonis Republicam (Oxford, 2003). 
Solomon, J. (trans.), Eudemian Ethics, in Barnes (ed.), Complete Works, vol. 2, 1922-
1981. 
Stocks, J. L. (trans.), On the Heavens, in Barnes (ed.), Complete Works, vol. 1, 447-511. 
Striker, G., “Antipater, Or the Art of Living”, in M. Schofield and G. Striker (eds.), 
Norms of Nature (Cambridge, 2007), 185-204. 
Vlastos, G., “Justice and Happiness” in id., Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 111-139. 
Waterfield, R. (trans.), Plato: Republic (Oxford, 1993). 
Wheeler, M., Review of Aristotle on Truth, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 44 
(2006), 469-470. 
Woods, M. (trans. and comm.), Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II and VII, 2nd edn. 
[Eudemian Ethics] (Oxford, 2005). 
 
 
